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Abstract
This paper explores how the introduction of an experience rated system of
unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where
implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and
unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience rated
systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long term employment as
firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our
analysis shows that, despite the higher costs of layoffs, the introduction of
experience rating may increase long term employment. Moreover, it
unambiguously increases welfare. 
JEL Classification: H20, J63, J65.















It is a striking difference between US and European systems of unemployment insurance that 
US unemployment insurance systems usually imply some degree of experience rating. 
Experience rating means that unemployment insurance contribution rates of an individual firm 
increase with layoffs or with the amount of unemployment benefits paid to workers whom the 
firm has laid off. The main argument in favour of introducing experience rating is that a 
system of unemployment insurance without experience rating distorts the employment 
decisions of firms.
1 As Feldstein (1978, p.844) puts it, a system with little or no experience 
rating “imposes an efficiency loss by distorting the behavior of firms to lay off too many 
workers when demand falls rather than cutting prices or building inventories.” Feldstein 
concludes that an increase in experience rating will reduce unemployment and increase the 
efficiency of the labour market. 
 
The view that experience rating will reduce incentives for firms to lay off workers temporarily 
is plausible. But does this necessarily imply that experience rating is a desirable element of 
unemployment insurance systems? Burdett and Wright (1989) claim that Feldstein´s argument 
in favour of experience rating only holds if the overall number of workers hired by a firm is 
fixed. However, given that firms anticipate the costs of future layoffs when they make their 
hiring decisions, the question arises whether the introduction of experience rating will have an 
adverse effect on long term employment. Burdett and Wright (1989) analyse this question in a 
standard model of implicit contracts with unemployment. It turns out that the introduction of 
experience rating does reduce temporary layoffs, but it also reduces long term employment. 
This result suggests that Feldstein´s argument in favour of experience rating might actually be 
misleading because it neglects the negative impact of increased layoff costs on long term 
hiring decisions. 
 
The present paper reconsiders the employment and welfare effects of experience rating in a 
standard implicit contract model which is similar the one used by Burdett and Wright (1989), 
henceforth denoted BW. The key difference is that we explicitly take into account the budget 
constraint of the unemployment insurance system. This difference complicates the analysis 
somewhat but leads to results which are exactly opposed to those in BW. Most importantly, 
we show that the introduction of experience rating unambiguously increases welfare. It may 
                                                 
1 For a very useful survey of theoretical and empirical work on unemployment insurance systems see Holmlund 
(1998). 
  1also increase long term employment. Our findings differ from those in BW because their 
analysis neglects that the introduction of a tax on layoffs allows to reduce the average 
contribution rate of the unemployment insurance system. They do not explicitly analyse the 
budget constraint of the unemployment insurance system but assume that budget balance may 
be achieved through lump sum taxes.  
 
This paper is also related to the broader literature which deals with the impact of changes in 
layoff costs on labour market performance and economic efficiency (see e.g. Bentolila and 
Bertola (1990), Burda (1992) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)).
2 Concerning the 
employment effects of layoff costs, these contributions lead to mixed results.
3 The main 
difference to the present paper is that these contributions use search and matching models of 
the labour market whereas this paper uses an implicit contract framework. Moreover, our 
analysis focuses on layoff costs implied by the structure of the unemployment insurance 
system whereas the papers mentioned above are concerned with different types layoff costs 
such as, for instance, severance payments. 
 
The following analysis is set up as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 
three analyses the effect of introducing experience rating on welfare and employment. Section 
four concludes.  
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a firm which produces a good y using labour (n) as the only factor of production. 
The firm´s  production function is f , with f ) n ( 0 ) n ( ' ' f , 0 ) n ( ' < >
0
. The firm faces uncertainty 
concerning the price of its good in the output market. There are two possible states of the 
world. We refer to these two states as state 1 (the “good state”) occurring with probability p 
and state 2 (the “bad state”) occurring with probability 1-p. In the good state, the output price 
is assumed to be equal to unity.  In the bad state, the price is  1 < φ ≤ .
4  
 
The firm maximizes expected profits and offers state contingent contracts to m risk averse 
workers. Following BW, we call these workers attached and we assume that, once these 
                                                 
2 For recent surveys see Ljungqvist (2001) or Addison and Teixeira (2001). 
3 The factors explaining these differences are studied in Ljungqvist (2001). 
4 The price shock can also be interpreted as a productivity shock. The restriction to two states is not critical for 
our results but facilitates the presentation.  
  2workers are attached to the firm, they have no other employment opportunities in the period 
under consideration. Accordingly, the firm can only employ workers attached to it, i.e. it is 
impossible to hire more than m workers after the state of the world is revealed. In the 
following, we also interpret m as the level of long term employment per firm. The contract C 
specifies wages for the two states w1 and w2 and the number of workers to be employed in the 
two states, i.e.   Workers may either be employed and work one unit of 
time in the firm they are attached to or be unemployed, i.e. we exclude work sharing 
arrangements.
). n , n , w , w ( C 2 1 2 1 =
5 If the number of employed workers nj in some state j is lower than the number 
of attached workers m, the firm dismisses m-nj workers. We refer to these layoffs as 
temporary layoffs. This has the purpose to distinguish between workers who are hired by a 
firm and laid off later as opposed to workers who never are hired in the first place. Workers 
are laid off at random, so that each worker faces the same probability (m-nj)/m of being laid 
off in state j. Workers who are laid off receive unemployment insurance benefits b. Workers 
and the firm take b as given.  
 
The utility of each worker is given by the utility function  , with   
, where c is the worker´s consumption, h denotes hours of work 
and subscripts are partial derivatives. Workers will only accept contracts with the firm under 
consideration if the expected utility from being attached to the firm is at least as high as the 
reservation level 
) h , c ( U , 0 ) h , c ( Uc >
0 ) h , c ( U , 0 ) h , c ( U cc h < <
U. This implies that all contracts have to satisfy the constraint 
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When choosing the optimal contract C, the firm takes the reservation utilityUas given. The 
expected profit of the firm is 
 
() ( ) n m ( ) t 1 ( n w ) n ( f ) p 1 ( ) n m ( ) t 1 ( n w ) n ( f p 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
e − β − + − φ − + − β − + − = π )
                                                
 (2) 
 
where t and β are parameters of the unemployment insurance system; t is a payroll tax and β 
is a parameter reflecting the degree of experience rating. With t>0 and β=0, we have the 
European type system of unemployment insurance, where contributions are typically simply 
 
5 On work sharing in implicit contract models see Burdett and Wright (1989b). 
  3payroll taxes and there is no experience rating. With t>0 and β>0, we have a US-type system 
with experience rating. 
 
The firm maximizes expected profitsπ subject to the participation constraint (1) and subject 
to  , j=1,2. The Lagrangean is   m n j ≤
) n m ( ) n m ( ) U U ( ) , , , m , n , n , w , w ( L 2 2 1 1
e e
2 1 2 1 2 1 − δ + − δ + − η + π = δ δ η    (3) 
 
The first order conditions for w1 and w2 are 
 
0 ) 1 , w ( U
m
1










 η + + − =
∂
∂
        ( 4 )  
 
0 ) 1 , w ( U
m
1










 η + + − − =
∂
∂
       ( 5 )  
 
For nj>0, j=1,2, (4) and (5) lead to the standard result that the wage rate is state independent, 
i.e. w1=w2. In the following analysis, we denote the optimal wage rate by w. The first order 
conditions for m, n1 and n2 can be written as 
 
() ( ) 0 ) 0 , b ( U ) 1 , w ( U n ) p 1 ( pn
m m
L
2 1 2 1 2 = δ + δ + − − +
η
− β − =
∂
∂
     (6) 
    
() 0 ) 0 , b ( U ) 1 , w ( U
m
p





= δ − −
η
+ β + + − =
∂
∂
     (7) 
 
() 0 ) 0 , b ( U ) 1 , w ( U
m
) p 1 (





= δ − −
− η
+ β + + − φ − =
∂
∂
   (8) 
  
(6) implies that one of the two employment contraints  m n j ≤ , j=1,2, must be binding. We 
assume that the employment constraint is binding in the good state, i.e. . We assume  m n1 =
  4further that some workers are dismissed in the bad state, i.e. n and  m 2 < 0 2 = δ .
6 
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Using (7) and (8) to eliminate the Lagrangean multipliers in (6) and making some 
rearrangements leads to 
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Using  w1=w2=w and n1=m in (1) yields 
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Equations (9)-(11) determine the equilibrium values of m, n2 and w for a given reservation 
utility of workers U. 
 
3. Effects of Introducing Experience Rating on Employment and Welfare 
 
It is the objective of the analysis to explore the effect of introducing experience rating on 
employment and welfare in our model. In the preceding section, we have only discussed the 
behaviour of an individual firm, which takes the reservation utility of workers   as given. In 
order to analyse the effects of policy changes for the economy as a whole, though, the model 
must be closed, i.e. some assumption must be made on how U is determined.
7 There are two 
simple ways of doing this. Firstly, one may assume that the economy consists of a given, large 
number of identical firms of the type described above, and that all workers seek employment 
in one of these firms. This would imply that U adjusts such that all workers will be attached 
to some firm in equilibrium. As a consequence, if the number of firms is denoted by Q and the 
                                                 
6 It is straightforward to show that the existence of unemployment benefits (b>0) is a necessary condition for 
unemployment to occur in this model. This point is discussed extensively in Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980). 
7 We also assume that there is no uncertainty in the aggregate and that firm owners are perfectly diversified (or 
risk neutral). 
  5overall number of workers is normalized to unity, we always have m=1/Q. It is clear that, in 
such a model, the question of whether or not experience rating may have a negative impact on 
hiring decisions is trivial because m is given.  
 
The second possibility is to assume that workers have an alternative to working in the type of 
firm described above. For instance, one may assume that workers may have the option to be 
voluntarily long term unemployed or to work in an informal sector. The utility when choosing 
this alternative is constant, such thatUis fixed. In the following, we concentrate on this case.
8 
A second important issue for the analysis of policy changes is the question of whether or not 
the budget constraint of the unemployment insurance system is taken into account. In the 
following, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we neglect the budget constraint of the 
unemployment insurance system by assuming that changes in revenue induced by changes in 
policy instruments are neutralized by lump sum transfers or taxes. This is also done in BW. 
Not suprisingly, as will be shown below, our results confirm the findings in BW. As a second 
step, we assume that reforms in the unemployment insurance system must be revenue neutral, 
i.e. the budget constraint of the unemployment insurance system must hold. This assumption 
complicates the analysis but it turns out that the results are different. 
 
Consider first the case where the budget constraint of the unemployment insurance system is 
neglected. The effects of changes in t and β on m, n2 and w can be derived by totally 
differentiating (9)-(11) and setting  0 U d = . Since we are interested in the effects of 
introducing experience rating, we assume that the reform departs from an equilibrium with 
β=0, t>0. Since the algebra is tedious but straightforward, we relegate the formal analysis to 
the appendix and state the results as 
 
Proposition 1: 
Departing from an equilibrium with t>0, β=0,  
i) an inrease in t reduces m and n2 and 
ii) an increase in β reduces the number of temporary layoffs (m-n2) and reduces the number of 
attached workers per firm (m). The effect on n2 is ambiguous. 
 
It is not surprising that an increase in the payroll tax t reduces both the number of attached 
workers (m) and the level of employment in the bad state (n2). Our key interest is in the effect 
                                                 
8 The analysis in BW also focuses on this case. 
  6of a change in β. Firstly, it turns out that an increase in the tax parameter β does reduce the 
number of temporary layoffs. This is the effect emphasized by Feldstein (1978), as mentioned 
in the introduction. However, an increase in β also increases the ex ante expected labour cost 
per worker hired. As a consequence, the number of attached workers (m) declines. So it turns 
out that our results in proposition 1 confirm the point made by BW: If the introduction of 
experience rating is conceived as the introduction of an additional tax on layoffs, it may have 
detrimental effects on hiring deicisions and, hence, reduce the level of long term employment. 
 
However, while it is clear that the effects of experience rating on long term hiring decisions of 
firms is important, it also has to be taken into account that an increase in β does not 
necessarily imply an increase in the ex ante expected cost of labour because it makes more 
revenue available for the unemployment insurance system. This revenue may be used to 
reduce the “non experience rated component” of the unemployment insurance system, i.e. an 
increase in β allows to reduce t, given the level of unemployment benefits b. The budget of 
the unemployment insurance system can be written as 
 
b ) n m )( p 1 ( ) n m )( p 1 ( ) n ) p 1 ( pm ( wt 2 2 2 − − = β − − + − + .       ( 1 2 )  
 
In the following, we consider the introduction of experience rating, i.e. an increase in β, 
assuming that t is adjusted such that the budget constraint in (12) continues to hold. We derive 
the effects of this reform on the endogenous variables by differentiating and solving equations 




Departing from an equilibrium with t>0, β=0, a revenue neutral increase in β increases n2 and 
may increase or reduce m. The number of temporary layoffs (1-p)(m-n2) may increase or 
decrease. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that it is important to take into account the budget constraint of the public 
sector. Most importantly, it turns out that experience rating does not necessarily reduce the 
number of attached workers (m). For instance, it can be shown that the introduction of 
experience rating increases m if the productivity difference between the good state and the 
bad state is large enough, i.e. φ is small. The reason is simply that the increase in β generates 
  7revenue which allows to reduce t, which c.p. reduces the expected cost of labour. Given that 
m may increase, it is not surprising that the number of temporary layoffs may rise or fall. So 
the main insight provided by the results in proposition 2 is that experience rating neither 
necessarily reduces the level of long term employment, nor does it necessarily reduce the 
number of temporary layoffs. The number of temporary layoffs may increase simply because 
more workers may be hired ex ante. Of course, the crucial question is whether experience 




Departing from an equilibrium with t>0, β=0, a revenue neutral increase in β leads to a Pareto 
improvement. 
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
The introduction of experience rating gives rise to a Pareto improvement for the following 
reason. In this model, the (expected) utility of workers is fixed and given by U. So in order to 
evaluate the efficiency effects of the reform under consideration, we can restrict our attention 
to the effect on profits. When making its layoff decisions, each individual firm takes its 
contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system as given. It thus does not take into 
account that more temporary layoffs must lead to higher contributions, given the level of b. 
Temporary layoffs thus give rise to what may be called a negative fiscal externality on other 
firms. This implies that, for the economy as a whole, temporary layoffs are inefficiently high. 




This paper explores the effects of experience rating on employment and layoff decisions in a 
simple implicit contract model. It turns out that, in our model, the introduction of experience 
rating may increase or reduce long term employment but unambiguously raises welfare. Our 
results thus suggest that experience rating is a desirable feature of unemployment insurance 
systems. The fact that firms anticipate the higher layoff costs implied by experience rating is 
an important factor in the evaluation of this system, but it does not imply that experience 
rating is not desirable. Our analysis thus qualifies the views expressed in BW. Moreover, our 
  8results suggest that the introduction of experience rating should be considered in particular as 
an option for European labour markets, where unemployment benefits are typically relatively 
generous. Of course, the results derived in this paper have to be evaluated in the light of the 
model underlying our analysis. The importance of implicit contracts as a factor contributing to 
wage rigidities in existing labour markets is the subject of an ongoing debate. Moreover, our 
analysis does not tackle the question of what the optimal degree of experience rating is. One 
of the problems associated with experience rating is that it places an additional burden on 
firms which have to lay off workers permanently. Given this, it may accelerate the decline of 




Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
For notational simplicity we define p*=pm+(1-p)n2 and  
 
) 1 , w ( U















































































) p 1 ( * p * U ) p 1 (
0 * U
) 1 , w ( U
) 1 , w ( U








Solving for dn2 and dm yields 
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Proof of Proposition 2: 
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The sign of the determinant of Ψ can be determined as follows. Denote the revenue of the 
unemployment insurance system minus benefits paid to the unemployed by R. R can be 
defined as a function  
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Assume that a marginal increase in t, holding constant β and b, but taking into account the 






































































Since ∆>0, we also have  >0, given that the Laffer curve assumption mentioned above holds, 
which we assume to be the case. We can now solve (A.7) for dm and dn
Γ
2, which yields 
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In the text, we argue that it is easy to find examples where m increases. To see this, note that 
the change in m is unambiguously positive if φ approaches zero. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
 
As mentioned in the text, the reform under consideration yields a Pareto improvement if it 
raises aggregate profits. Aggregate profits increase if expected profits per firm ( ) increase. 
Differentiating equation (2), using the first order conditions of the firm´s profit maximization 
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Using the results of the proof of proposition 2 yields 
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